1Exceptions arise when a change in the composition of the chamber requires one of the parties to reduce the number of its partisans on a committee (which rarely occurs because party leaders typically negotiate a larger committee size to accommodate compositional changes in the full House) or when a committee is abolished.
2Shepsle (1978) presents data on the congresses from 1958–74 showing that half of all freshmen seek transfers or the acquisition of additional assignments in their first non-freshman term. By the time members are in their fifth term or higher, 95% have sought to alter their freshman portfolio in some manner, some multiple times.
3In contrast, representatives who are fairly close to the top of a seniority queue may be tempted to remain until those assigned to places higher in the queue have left the scene. Hall and van Houweling (1995) find some suggestive evidence: representatives who were second in their full committee queues in 1994 were more likely to run for reelection than other members, particularly when they were younger than the committee chair (after controlling for the main effect of age).
4Prior to 1975, this was the Democratic membership of the House Ways and Means Committee; after that point, this role was assumed by the Steering Committee of the Democratic Caucus.
5Some vacancies may remain unfilled. Others are filled provisionally (called waiver appointments); these are filled only for the congress in question by granting a member a waiver to serve even if in nominal violation of Caucus rules governing committee service.
6One of the authors interviewed a senior advisor to Speaker Pelosi who stated that he personally organized the randomizations by writing the names of newly assigned members on slips of paper, placing them in a box, and having a member of the Committee on Committees draw slips from the box to establish the ordering. E-mail correspondence with an advisor to Speaker Foley and Minority Leader Gephardt confirmed that similar procedures were used during their time in office.
7This data comes from the committee assignment datasets collected by Garrison Nelson, Charles Stewart, and their collaborators.
8Deletion of these observations removes less than 20% of the data and makes the remaining observations substantially more homogenous. Moreover, including them in the analysis does not affect the substantive conclusions presented in this article (details are available in the online appendix). We hesitate to extend our inferences to the exclusive committees or to non-freshmen randomization groups because these groups contribute so little information to the overall estimates.
9For example, if a three-member randomization group was assigned ranks 19, 20, and 21 on a particular committee, we rescale their ranks to −1, 0, and 1. Negative ranks correspond to more senior queue positions.
10For example, the number of Democrats on each committee increases in tandem with the number of Democrats in the House as a whole. As a result, freshmen members joining the committee receive lower nominal ranks in congresses with large Democratic caucuses.
11Details are available in the online appendix.
12All of the analyses presented in this paper were conducted using the R statistical computing environment. Replication code and data are available from the authors on request.
13Including covariates can increase the precision with which the effects are estimated. We re-estimated the models reported here using a number of pre-assignment characteristics. The estimates produced by these models were neither substantively different nor more precise than the results reported here; they are available in the online appendix.
14In other words, although we expect that the difference between ranking first and second is larger than the difference between second and third, it is unlikely that the effect of being ranked 14th vs. 15th is much different from 15th vs. 16th.
15We identified members who served as subcommittee chairs using various editions of the Congressional Directory.
16In 9 cases out of 1268, members retain their initial committee assignments but have not yet served as subcommittee chairs. We treat these as zeros for this analysis, but our results are not sensitive to other assumptions.
17These estimates were generated using the Zelig package for R, which uses simulation to calculate point estimates and confidence intervals for quantities of interest that are not model parameters.
18As with subcommittee chairs, we restrict the analysis of career transfer outcomes to randomization groups in the 80th–105th Congresses. In 67 cases, members remained on their initial committees at the end of the 110th Congress. Transfers after the sixth term are quite rare, so we treat these cases as non-transfers.
19Strictly speaking, the estimated difference in transfer probability associated with assignment to a legislator’s first-choice committee does not estimate a causal effect, because the Committee on Committees does not randomly assign members to receive their first-choice committees. Frisch and Kelly (2007) provides data on committee requests; details of the calculation are provided in the online appendix.
20Dividing the data in this way ensures that each randomization group contributes equally to the two subsets, so that differences in transfer behavior are not due to the determinants of the size of the randomization group. This analysis excludes the 134 members ranked in the middle of randomization groups with odd numbers of freshmen.
21Note that we do not attempt to control for the length of time that members serve in the House because this is determined after the assignment of seniority ranks. While the results of the previous section suggest that differences in seniority do not affect tenure in office, controlling for the length of time that members have to introduce bills after initial seniority ranks are determined makes a causal interpretation more difficult.
*Thanks to Adam Glynn, Dan Hopkins, Kevin Quinn, Ian Yohai, Nolan McCarty, Keith Krehbiel, and two anonymous referees for comments on previous versions of this paper. Shepsle acknowledges support from the National Institute of Aging (ROI AG 021181).
ГЛАВА 64 Сьюзан осталась одна в тишине и сумерках Третьего узла. Стоявшая перед ней задача была проста: войти в компьютер Хейла, найти ключ и уничтожить все следы его переписки с Танкадо.
Нигде не должно остаться даже намека на «Цифровую крепость».